In this paper we extend the well known result of existence of Walrasian equilibrium given in Debreu (1952) to economies modeled over topological vector spaces. Our work is closely related to the previous results of Yannelis-Pranhakar (1983), and Tan and Yuan (1999), but unlike these papers we prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in infinite dimensional economies with interdependent and price-dependent utilities.
Introduction
Looking for commodities as physical goods which may differ on time or in the states of the world in which they become available, and allowing infinite variation in these contingents, the generalization of the classical model of General Equilibrium to models of economies with infinitely many commodities looks natural. Since the consumption sets of these economies are subsets of infinite dimensional vector spaces they are usually called, infinite dimensional economies.
The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of Walrasian equilibrium in economies whose consumption sets are subsets of a locally convex topological vector space with a lattice structure. Utilities are, interdependent, (i.e., may depend on the choices of others) and prices dependent. The set of consumers is finite.
Our work generalizes the seminal work of G. Debreu (1952) (see [1] ) to economies whose consumptions sets are subsets of locally convex topological vector spaces. Several economies to infinite dimensional economies. In the specialized literature are considered finite economies those whose consumption sets are subsets of finite dimensional vector spaces like n ℜ and infinite dimensional economies those whose consumption sets are subsets of infinite dimensional vector spaces, like, for instance, Banach spaces, the space of bounded functions, the set of square integrable functions, the set of bounded sequences, etc...
The main difficulty in extending to infinite-dimensional economies the well known results for finite dimensional economies, lies in the non-uniqueness of possible linear 1 Hasudorff 2 topologies to be chosen for a same infinite dimensional vector spaces, while in finite-dimensional vector spaces there are (essentially) a single topology combining these two properties (Hausdorff and linearity). More precisely, every linear Hausdorff topology on a finite dimensional space, define the same family of open sets. In infinite dimensional vector spaces this claim is no longer true. In this case we must choose a topology. The generality of the results obtained in these models depends largely on the chosen topology. Recall that when we choose the topology we are choosing the family of open sets and consequently the continuous functions and also the compact sets, the convergent nets, etc. The existence of a continuous utility function and a compact budget constraints is a sufficient condition for the existence of the individual demand function. If we consider in a vector space, a weaker topology than another (i.e., a topology with less open subsets), some functions continuous in the initial topology will no longer be continuous in the weaker one. The less open sets a topology has, the less continuous functions there are, but more compact sets there are. Note that Hausdorff topology must have a significant number of open sets. A vector space with a topology associate is called a topological vector space.
Given that utility functions represent preferences, is clear that we must be careful when elucidating the topology. We must try not to lose generality and lose the fewest possible utility functions to be considered in our analysis. On the other hand, recall that prices are a subset of the linear and continuous real functions (functionals) on a given topological space then, we need choose a topology such that linear functionals remain being continuous even when we consider a weaker topology. The weakest topology verifying this property is called the weak topology. For a survey on this topic see [2] .
Our results are close to the previous work of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) (see [3] conformed by prices and an allocation, in a dual pair ( ) , E F (see below), such that every consumer maximizes his preferences (that may depends on the choices of the others and/or on prices) in their budget sets. Here, by E we denote a locally convex topological vector space and by F we denote a total subspace of * E the algebraic dual of E i.e.; the set of all linear functionalities defined on E We consider that the 1 A topology defined in a vector space is said to be linear if with respect to it, the vectors sum and the multiplication of a vector by a scalar are both continuous operations. consumption set of each consumer is the positive cone of a locally convex topological vector space. In order to prove the existence of the Walrasian equilibrium we assume the existence of a countable and increasing family of bounded and closed subsets of E which cover E As we shall see this property is not to strong and it is verified by a wide range of topological vector spaces.
Unlike [5] we do not consider the hypothesis of 0-diagonality quasi-concave utility functions, however we assume the weak continuity of such functions. This condition appears naturally in different situations. In particular in finance models, where any condition with respect to the continuity of utilities should be considered to ensure the existence of equilibrium, see for instance [6] . Generally this condition is known as consumer impatience and it is equivalent to the weak continuity of utilities. Unlike de G. Chichilnisky and A. Mas-Colell (see [7] and [8] ) and others authors, we do not consider the hypothesis of properness for the utility functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we consider some topological facts which are necessary to understand the rest of the work. In Section 3 we introduce the model and in Section 4, we show the existence of a Social Equilibrium for a generalized game. In Section 5 we consider a pure exchange economy whose utilities are interdependent and prices dependent The consumption set, for this economy is the positive cone of a locally convex topological vector space and we prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, without any additional condition on the consumption set. In section 8 we analyze the main characteristics of the utility functions considered in this work. And finally we give some conclusions.
Some Topological Facts
Suppose E defined by F and will be denoted by the symbol ( )
, .
E F σ
The following result is useful (see [9] If V E ⊂ is a neighborhood of zero for some locally convex consistent topology with the dual ( )
Similarly, if W is a neighborhood of zero for a consistent locally convex topology on F then its polar
Note also that the Alaoglu's theorem provides something like a Heine-Borel property for the * -w topology, namely that closed an bounded subset of E′ are * -w compact.
Next we describe hemicontinuity of correspondences in terms of nets. 
The Model
We consider a locally convex, topological vector space ( ) , E w equipped with a partial order . ≥ That is ≥ is a transitive reflexive and antisymmetric binary relation, compatible with the algebraic structure of E in the sense that, the following properties are verified: : ,
→ is the utility function of the i-th player. Where: We consider that each agent chooses 
The Social Equilibrium Existence
This background makes the following formal definition Social Equilibrium. 
In order to prove this theorem we need to proceed step by step. Some previous definitions, theorems and its corollaries are necessary. We shall use the following theorem [10] . The following fundamental fixed point theorem is due to Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg, see [11] . 
"Generalized" Economies and Pseudo-Games
Consider the locally convex topological vector space ( )
, , E w partially ordered by ≥ .
Consequently the positive cone is given by
i.e.; the subset of all of element of E lower bounded by 0.
In general we can consider the r − polars. We shall use a pseudo-game as a mathematical tool that allow us to prove the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in interchange economies. We consider consumers as the players of a pseudo game, and the budget set is the set of available strategies for each consumer. These players are looking to maximize their utility functions. A fictional player that corresponds to the market, is introduced. His objective is to choose a set of prices p P + ∈ maximizing ( ) ( )
Now, we represent an interchange economy in terms of pseudogames.
Let :
× → be the budget correspondence for the i-th agent, given by,
2. Note that the budget correspondence is For some 0 >  we define the subset P P F
Note that this is a continuous correspondence between the ( )
We consider for each p P ∈  the i-th restricted budget set
and from the Alaoglu theorem is a ( ) given , x the choice of consumers.
• Given i x − and , p the i-th consumer looks to solve the optimization problem
• Given, x X ∈ the fictional player looks to solve
,
where by f we denote the fictional player. Let
 be the product of the budgets correspondence and
 be the correspondence product given by
Given that we are in the conditions of the theorem (2) then, there exists a fixed point for the correspondence , µ i.e.; ( ) ( )
This fixed point is a Social equilibrium for the - economy with the restricted budget set.
As it is easy to see, this Social equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium for the restricted economy.
 be a Nash equilibrium, then the following inequality holds,
, , , , for all 
Next we show that there exists a restricted economy, such that its Walrasian equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy.
The Walrasian Equilibrium
We shall choose an useful weak compact subset 
In order to do this, we begin considering the set of feasible allocations for the economy, i.e.; the set ( )
. 
This is an habitual assumption in macroeconomic and in finance theory.
Considerations on the Utilities, Revisited
Note that following this approach, we have shown that there exist the Walrasian equilibrium even when individual preferences depend on the action of the others, or they are prices dependent.
Prices dependent preferences are considered for instance in [14] , [15] and in [16] .
Preferences for goods may depend on prices because, for instance, people judge quality from price. This procedure can be supported by a rational strategy under a framework of uncertainty, but it looses a part of this value when, even in a framework of uncertainty, some peoples are considered as expert. In this case the preference is influenced by the action of the others. This dependence is an important factor for decisions in several circumstances. For instance when people imite the action of their pairs, in particular when individuals look to fashion.
In Game Theory the rational individual choice depends on that the others are doing, so in this field the literature considering this dependence is natural and abundant.
However, in economics the literature looking for the dependence of individual preferences on that others are doing is very sparse. Moreover generally, preferences are considered part of the foundations of the economy and therefore immutable. In our approach utility functions can be considered as prices depending, and the set of alternatives can change according with the choice of the others consumers and even under these circumstances, provided that : 
Conclusions
In this work we have shown that it is possible to extend to economies of infinite dimension, the demonstration of the existence of the Walrasian equilibrium made for finite economies. Without significant loss of generality in the choice of utility functions and consequently in the possible preferences to be considered in the model. Moreover, we show that Walrasian equilibrium exists, even though these utilities defined in very general sets (locally convex topological vector spaces) also depend on the choice of others and prices. In order to do this, we use techniques well known in Functional
Analysis. This extension shows the strength of concepts such as the Walraisian equilibrium and its permanence when we generalize the economic models.
We conclude saying that the techniques of Functional Analysis are of great utility for solving in an unified way, several economic problems corresponding to different areas of the economic theory. For instance, for growth theory in which the vector space of continuous functions is the set in which utilities or profits are maximized, or for finance theory in which the vector spaces 2 L of square integrable functions is widely used.
